The inter-institutional balance of power within the EU is central to the new constitutional order. It is central when viewed from the perspective of legitimacy/democracy, and from the perspective of efficacy. It is not therefore surprising that this topic, which is dealt with in Title IV of Part 1 of the Constitution, has been contentious. This paper begins by examining the process in the Convention for deliberation about the institutional aspects of the Draft Constitution. This is followed by discussion of the changes that relate to legislative power.
framework for a deliberative dialogue on the content of the legislation between the EP, Council and Commission. The extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to new areas is a natural development, building on what has occurred in earlier Treaty reform. It enhances the legitimacy of Union legislation and its democratic credentials by enabling the EP to have input into the making of legislation in these areas.
The EP is also accorded powers in relation to the new breed of delegated regulations.
A European regulation is a non-legislative act of general application for the implementation of legislative acts and certain specific provisions of the Constitution.
11 It may either be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, or be binding as regards the result to be achieved, on all the Member States to which it is addressed, but leaving the national authorities entirely free to choose the form and means of achieving that result. This therefore provides for secondary European laws, which are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, and secondary European framework laws, which are binding as to result, but which leave the Member State discretion as to implementation.
European laws and framework laws may delegate to the Commission the power to enact delegated regulations to 'supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the European law or framework law'. 12 The objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation shall be explicitly defined in the laws and framework laws. The delegation may not cover the essential elements in the area, which shall be reserved for the law or framework law. The conditions to which the delegation is subject shall be determined in the law or framework law, and that these may consist of the following possibilities. 13 The European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; or the delegated regulation may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the law or framework law. 14 There is much to be said in principle for the clearer delineation between primary laws and other legally binding norms. The fact that the Draft Constitution tackled the hierarchy of norms in Title V is therefore to be welcomed. There are, however, important issues left open by these provisions, which will have a marked impact on the overall institutional balance of power within the EU. 15 
Legislative Power and the Council
It is clear that the Council has a co-equal role in the legislative process with the EP. The Draft Constitution provides that the Council will jointly enact legislation with the EP, 16 and this will for the most part be pursuant to the ordinary legislative procedure. The Council's role in this regard has not been contentious.
(a) Council Formation(s) for the Exercise of Legislative Power
What has provoked more discussion is the nature of the Council formation that is to exercise its legislative power. The solution in the Draft Constitution was to have a Legislative and General Affairs Council (LGAC). When the LGAC acted in its legislative capacity each Member State's representation was to be composed of one or two representatives at ministerial level with relevant expertise, which would reflect the business on the Council's agenda. 17 The rationale for this structure was that the Council would have a specific legislative formation, and that one of the two Member State representatives might become a quasi-permanent fixture who would develop more general expertise in European matters. It would then enable this Council formation to develop a broader view of EU legislation taken as a whole.
The solution embodied in the Draft Constitution has not however proven acceptable to the IGC. The Italian Presidency of the IGC distributed a questionnaire to the Member States, asking, inter alia, whether the Council's legislative function should be exercised by a single Council formation, or whether a legislative function should be exercised by each of the Council formations. 18 The majority of the Member States favoured according legislative power to each of the Council formations, rather than having one dedicated Legislative
Council. This view has been incorporated in a revised version of Article I-23 placed before the IGC by the Italian Presidency. 19 There is much to be said for the IGC view that the General Affairs and Legislative functions should be separated. The two are distinct. It would almost certainly create an excessive burden on one body for it to have responsibility for both issues. This is especially so given that the General Affairs Council will have its hands full with ensuring the overall coordination of the Council's work. 20 There is more room for debate about whether it would be desirable for there to be a dedicated Legislative Council. The main arguments in favour are that it would engender greater legislative coherence, 21 and emphasize the two-chamber character of the EU legislative process. The arguments against are that it might lead to some loss of expertise by way of comparison with exercise of legislative power by the sectoral Council formations. It might also lead to somewhat odd results, given the system for the hierarchy of norms embodied in the Draft Constitution. If there were a dedicated Legislative Council, it would only deal with laws and framework laws. This would mean that delegated regulations would continue to fall within the remit of the sectoral Councils, since such norms would not be regarded as legislation for these purposes. 22 Coherence within a particular area might well suffer if primary laws were the responsibility of a Legislative Council, while closely related delegated regulations were to fall within the remit of sectoral Councils.
(b) Voting within the Council
The other issue that has been contentious concerns voting within the Council, more particularly the areas that should remain subject to unanimity, and the calculation of the qualified majority.
There was, not surprisingly, continued discussion and disagreement within the Convention on the Future of Europe as to the areas that should remain subject to unanimity.
The general strategy within the Draft Constitution has been to move to qualified majority voting where agreement on this move could be achieved. This was combined with the insertion of a general 'passerelle' clause enabling the European Council to decide on its own initiative and by unanimity, that there should be a shift to qualified majority voting in that area. 23 The Commission continues however to press for further reduction in the areas subject to unanimity, believing from past experience under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties that the 'passerelle' clause will not be used. 24 The Commission's strategy for the IGC of removing the unanimity requirement in particular areas, is complemented by proposals to replace unanimity with either reinforced qualified majority voting, or to have a new definition of unanimity, whereby after a certain period of deliberation by the Council and discussion within the European Council, opposition from one or two Member States could no longer prevent the measure from being adopted, even where the Constitution specifies unanimity. 25 The calculation of the qualified majority for voting within the Council has also been contentious. This was not surprising given the prior experience in the negotiations leading to the Nice Treaty, where the options as to weighting of votes approached the Byzantine in terms of complexity. The calculation of the qualified majority in the Nice IGC cast into sharp relief the relative power of large, medium and small states in the Council. The compromise solution in the Nice Treaty, embodied in the Protocol on Enlargement of the Union, coupled with Declaration 20 on Enlargement, reflected the complexity of the discussions that had led to it.
The Draft Constitution has modified the Nice Treaty solution to some degree. The default position is that a qualified majority is to consist of the majority of the Member States, representing at least three-fifths of the population of the Union. Where however an act is not based on a proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of the Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs then there must be two-thirds of the Member States, representing at least three-fifths of the population of the Union. These provisions are to take effect on November 1
2009. 26 We shall however see that it was disagreement as to the votes wielded by particular
Member States within the Council that was the principal reason for the failure to agree on the Draft Constitution in the December 2003 Summit of the European Council.
Part 3: Executive Power
There have, as indicated above, been major debates within and outside the Convention concerning the location of executive power in the Union. It has been disagreement about these issues, rather than those concerning legislative power, that has occupied the attention of the key players, both within and outside the Convention.
It is however important to note at the outset that there is no ready or precise definition of executive power in the EU. We know, in formal terms at least, that legislative power under the Draft Constitution captures the making of EU laws and EU framework laws, including the relevant voting rules. 27 There is no ready-made analogous formal definition of executive power to be found within the Draft Constitution. The scope and nature of executive power is moreover more difficult to define in substantive terms, in the sense that it varies as between different nation states. We can nonetheless identify a core set of tasks that are commonly undertaken by the executive branch of government. The executive will usually plan the overall priorities and agenda for legislation. It will normally have principal responsibility for 8 foreign affairs and defence. The executive will have an important say in the structure and allocation of the budget. It will also have responsibility for the effective implementation of agreed policy initiatives and legislation that has been enacted.
Having said this, it is important to understand that there are a number of different dimensions to the debate about executive power in the EU that must be disaggregated, even though some are linked. There is the issue of the election of the Commission President; the internal organisation of the Commission; the internal operation of the Council; the Presidency or Presidencies of the Union; and the creation of an EU foreign minister. These issues will be considered in turn. This will be followed by discussion of shared executive power from the perspective of principle and pragmatism. This section will conclude with some thoughts as to how the disposition of shared executive power might operate in practice in diverse areas.
The Election of the Commission President
Let us turn first to the election of the Commission President. The Commission has in the past generally been opposed to the idea that its President should be elected. It feared the politicisation that might result. It has more recently changed its view, and come to accept that some form of elected President would enhance its legitimacy within the Union institutions, and that it would thereby strengthen the claims of the Commission President to be the President of the Union as a whole. The argument for electing the Commission President has also been supported on democratic grounds, since the voters would then be able, directly or indirectly, to 'throw out' the incumbents of political office that they disliked. The voters' inability to do this at present is one aspect of the critique concerning the EU's democratic deficit.
The debate then shifted as to who should elect the Commission President. Such an election could be direct, taking place at the same time as elections to the EP, with voters choosing the President by direct vote. The election could be indirect, the decision being taken by the EP.
There were also considerable differences of view about the consequences of any such change. There are some who feel that direct or indirect election would not markedly affect the modus operandi of the Commission. It would be very much business as usual, except the Commission would have the added legitimacy that comes from the election of its President.
There are others who accept that election would significantly alter the character of the It is also questionable whether the Commission would continue to retain its 'gold standard', the near monopoly of legislative initiative, if the President were elected. It could of course be argued that the retention of this monopoly would be strengthened if the President of the Commission were to be elected, since the incumbent of the office would, by definition, be representing those within the EP that had voted in his or her favour. The fact that a member of the executive is elected, directly or indirectly, by the legislature, does not however mean that the latter will accept with equanimity that the executive thus chosen has a legal monopoly over the introduction of legislation. The EP might equally feel that given that its democratic credentials are more direct than those of an indirectly elected Commission
President, that it should also have the right to initiate legislation, rather than merely exerting pressure on its 'leader' to do so. The nature of such a right would then be a matter for further debate. It might exist in parallel to that exercised by the Commission President, such that the EP could literally draft its own legislation, which would become law subject to approval from the Council. The EP might alternatively press for a right to initiate legislation that would then be drafted in detail by the Commission. We should not forget in this respect that the EP has pressed for a right of legislative initiative on a number of occasions in the past. The fact that it has not done so on other occasions is explicable on the ground that it wished to prioritise other issues, rather than any change of heart about the substance of the issue itself.
The EP has not surprisingly been in favour of an indirectly elected Commission President. It was however always doubtful whether the Member States would be willing to accept a regime in which they surrendered total control over the Presidency of the Commission to the EP. The solution in the Draft Constitution has brought a sharp dose of political reality to the debate.
The Member States have, unsurprisingly, not been willing to surrender this power.
The articles on the institutions make interest reading in this respect. Article I-19 (1) The result, at least for the present, is that the Commission President is indirectlyindirectly elected. It is difficult to believe that this will do much to enhance the legitimacy of the Commission, insofar as this is felt to be a desired or necessary objective. Nor will it enhance the democratic credentials of the Union, in the sense of allowing the voters to throw out those whom they dislike, and install another person with a different policy agenda. 41 It has also provided more specific guidance on the nature and size of each of the groups of Commissioners, and on the type of issues that would be decided by the College as a whole.
The Internal Organisation of the Commission
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There is much to be said for the Commission's proposal. A slimmed-down Commission of 15 Commissioners might still be the optimal way forward. It seems clear however that there is strong opposition to this in some quarters. Given that this is so, the Commission's schema makes sense and is infinitely preferable to the existing provisions of the Draft Constitution. The proposal is premised on the equality of all Commissioners, and on the need to find a way for the Commission to operate with 25 Commissioners in an enlarged EU. The formalisation and extension of the regime of groups of Commissioners offers a sensible and workable solution.
The Italian Presidency of the IGC has addressed a questionnaire to the Member States on the internal organization of the Commission, asking in particular whether the two-tier regime of Commissioners should be retained. 43 This is certainly one issue on which the IGC should depart from the provisions in the Draft Constitution. The impression conveyed at the time of writing by the most recent communiqué is however that the IGC will persist with the divide between voting and non-voting Commissioners, while attempting to clarify the roles responsibilities of the latter group. 
The Internal Organization of the Council
We considered above the changes proposed by the IGC in relation to the locus of legislative power within the Council. We must now consider the more general revisions to Article I-23
that are likely to be adopted that affect the Council's general internal organization and the way in which it exercises executive power. The IGC looks set to revise Article I-23. 45 The LGAC has been discarded. There is to be General Affairs Council, GAC, which has the task of ensuring consistency in the work of the different Council formations. The GAC will, as in the Draft Constitution, prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council. This is now to be done in liaison with both the President of the European Council as well as the Commission. 46 The provisions concerning the Foreign Affairs Council, FAC, remain the same. 47 The European Council will still make the decision concerning the list of other Council formations, although the revised text makes clear that this is to be by qualified majority. 48 A necessary consequence of discarding the LGAC is that, as we saw earlier, each of the Council formations will deliberate and vote on legislation within their respective areas. Meetings of Council formations will therefore be divided into two parts dealing with legislative and non-legislative functions.
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The method of choosing the Presidency of the Council formations has also altered. 
The President(s) of the Union: Hats and Labels
Perhaps the most significant debate about executive power has been concerned with the Presidency of the Union as a whole. This has at times bordered on the arcane, and much of the discussion smacks of a 'milliner's' tale: the talk was of one hat, two hats, shared hats and the like. This should not mask the issues of real power that were at stake. Two main positions can be identified. 52 It is safe to say that they were not welcomed by the Commission either.
The 'shock and awe' provoked by the Giscard proposals was explicable because they not only provided for an extended Presidency of the European Council, which was to be the highest authority of the Union, but also for a 'board' of seven including a Vice-President, the EU Foreign Minister, two other members of the European Council, plus the Presidents of Ecofin and the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This reconfigured European Council was also to have its own bureaucratic support mechanism. It is true that the 'most developed' form of these proposals did not survive long within the Convention. Substantial parts hit the 'cutting room floor' and those opposed to the 'separate hats' view congratulated themselves on curbing or even emasculating the Giscardian vision.
The result as expressed in the Draft Constitution nonetheless embodies the central feature of the 'separate hats' view. Article I-21 stipulates that the European Council shall elect a President, by qualified majority, for two and half years, renewable once.
The President(s) of the Union: Power and Authority
The victory, albeit qualified, for the 'separate hats' view is however only part of the story about the locus of executive power within the EU. Article I-21(1) tells us that there is going to be a long term President of the European Council, and an end to the existing six-month rotating system. It tells us nothing about the division of power between the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council. It is the nature of their respective powers, both de jure and de facto, that will shape the way in which the totality of executive power operates within the EU.
The importance of this point can be demonstrated from three related perspectives. We can consider proposals for the division of power that emerged in the background to the Convention; we can analyse the articles of the Draft Constitution; and we can focus on the political manoeuvring in the IGC on this issue. These will be considered in turn. however simple to divine. 54 We have to piece together the answer from the articles relating to the European Council, and the Council. These will be considered in turn. The argument for divided or shared executive power may be put in the following way.
The assumption that executive power in nation states is 'unitary', residing with the government stricto sensu, is an assumption that is often belied, both de jure and de facto, by legal and political reality. A more realistic picture of executive power within nation states would recognise that such power is exercised not only by a discrete set of ministers that form the 'government', but also by a plethora of other bodies, agencies, and firms to which power has been contracted-out, over which the government has varying degrees of control. There is on this second view therefore nothing wrong, in terms of principle, in the EU with executive prove to be to the liking of some Member States, then it could lead to further institutional developments outside the strict letter of the Constitution. Better therefore to recognise shared executive power within the body of the Constitution, and attempt to structure and control it, than have it develop in unpredictable ways outside the constitutional remit.
The Disposition of Shared Executive Power in the EU Constitutional Order:
The Reality of Power Sharing
It seems highly likely that some form of shared executive power will be retained by the IGC in the final Constitution. We have seen that arguments of principle and pragmatism can be made for some form of shared executive power in the EU. This does not however tell us who will and should do what, nor does it tell us how the component parts of the executive will inter-relate in practice. The 'answers' to these issues will of course not be fully known until we see the final text of the Constitution, and until we have some experience as to how the system will operate. We can nonetheless make some headway on the information that is presently available. The discussion is best conducted by distinguishing different aspects of executive power identified above, since the disposition of power sharing might well vary in these different areas.
(a) The Setting of Priorities and the Planning of the Legislative Agenda
The legal and political divide between the European Council and the Commission will be especially important in relation to the planning of the EU's work programme and its legislative agenda.
We can begin by looking more closely at the relevant legal provisions of the Draft
Constitution. In relation to the European Council, the changes in Article I-20 from Article 4 TEU were noted earlier. The Draft Constitution provides that the European Council shall define the EU's priorities, as well as defining its general political directions. It should be recognised that this language is mandatory, and that the additional task of defining the EU's priorities is not expressly qualified by the adjective 'general'. 64 It might be open to the ECJ to read the word 'general' onto priorities, but there nothing requires this conclusion. The existing formulation makes sense as it stands, and it can be argued that if the framers of the Draft Constitution had wished to limit the European Council in this respect they could simply have said 'and shall define … its general priorities'. The connection between the extended tasks of the European Council and the role of its President is obvious, but worth stating nonetheless. The President must, inter alia, chair the European Council and drive forward its work. 65 The work of the European Council now expressly embraces setting priorities for the EU, and hence the President will have the obligation to drive this forward and will have the power that comes with it. The legal provisions which relate to the powers of the European Council concerning the overall priorities for the EU are in one sense a classic example of law playing catch up with political reality, given that the European Council has been playing a role in relation to priorities for some considerable time.
In relation to the Commission, the main legal provision that is of relevance is Article in the Council's Rules of Procedure. These rules provided that the GAC would recommend to the European Council a multi-annual programme for the next three years, which was to be based on a joint proposal drawn up by the Presidencies concerned in consultation with the Commission. 67 In the light of this multi-annual programme, it would be for the two Presidencies due to hold office in the following year to submit jointly a draft annual programme for activities during that year. 68 The language of the Council's Rules of Procedure thus placed the Council in the driving seat in relation to the development of the multi-annual programme: it was to be based on a joint proposal drawn up by the Presidencies concerned in consultation with the Commission. The language of Article I-25(1) frames matters the other way round, such that the Commission shall initiate the multi-annual programme with a view to securing inter-institutional agreement. It is nonetheless doubtful whether this signifies a change of substance, given that the Commission has always had a major say in shaping the multi-annual programme.
It is clear that legal provisions affirm and reinforce the regime of shared executive power that has been decided on by the framers of the Draft Constitution. The very fact that the European Council's tasks are defined so as to include setting the priorities for the Union necessarily empowers the President of the European Council in this regard. It makes it impossible to argue in legal terms that this should be the exclusive preserve of the Commission, as does the fact that the Commission's power to initiate multi-annual programming is with a view to securing inter-institutional agreement, not the imposition of a fait accompli. It should also be recognised that the relevant legal provisions are 'delicately balanced' and give comfort to the Commission as well as to the European Council. Thus while the priority-setting task of the European Council is not limited by the adjective 'general', it can equally be argued that the European Council cannot go so far as to initiate its own formal multi-annual programme, since this would then trespass on the Commission's power of initiation over such matters. In that sense, it is for the Commission to 'factor in' the European Council's decisions about priorities into the annual and multi-annual programming the initiation of which remains its preserve.
We can turn now to consider how the European Council and the Commission will
inter-relate in practice when setting the policy priorities and agenda under the Constitution. It is likely that the President of the European Council will exert greater influence over the general setting of priorities and the overall legislative agenda than was the case previously.
This is because the President will be in office for five years. The President will therefore have time to develop a vision for the EU's development in a way that was simply not possible with the six-monthly rotation system. 69 It is also predictable that successive Presidents will wish to leave a 'mark' on the EU, in the form of an agenda that they will press to see effectuated during their term of office. Institutional support will be of importance in this respect. The European Council has not hitherto had an established institutional support mechanism to rival that of the Commission, but this has not prevented it from exercising real input into the pace and nature of the Union's development. The position under the Draft Constitution is that the European Council is to be 'assisted' by the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.
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The nature of this assistance will develop over time. It would be surprising if it did not blossom into a species of institutional support suited to the specific needs of the 'new' European Council.
Having said this, it is clear that the Commission, and its President, will nonetheless continue to be of great importance in setting the overall agenda for the EU. It is the Commission that is to initiate the annual and multi-annual programming with the aim of securing inter-institutional agreement. 71 The Commission President co-operates with the President of the European Council in ensuring the proper preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council. 72 The Commission President can moreover rely on the considerable force of the Commission bureaucracy.
We may be able to press further in assessing shared executive power against the criteria of conflict-co-operation and coherence. The relationship between the Presidency of the European Council and the Commission will evolve over time. It is interesting to reflect on the nature of this relationship through the lens of conflict-co-operation, in order to see which of these is likely to predominate, and to reflect also on the implications of shared executive power for the coherence of the EU's agenda.
The worst case scenario is that there will be conflict between the European Council and the Commission, and that this will lead to inter-institutional tensions and fights redolent of those that beset Council/Commission relations in the late 1960s and through the 1970s.
The result on this worst case scenario would be that the coherence of the EU executive agenda would necessarily suffer, such that any agreed initiatives would be partial and fragmentary.
It should however be recognised that there are numerous incentives for the two players to co-operate and to develop a coherent agenda. There are a number of differing reasons why this is so.
The most obvious is that inter-institutional tension leading to failure to develop a coherent agenda would be detrimental to the EU, a consequence that would be in the interest of neither of the main players. They would both be held responsible and this would be so no matter whether the 'objective reality' was that one side was more to blame than the other.
There is a further reason which is closely related to the first, but distinct nonetheless.
If shared executive power fails the consequences for the respective powers of the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council will be uncertain. Neither will be able to predict with certainty the consequences for the future disposition of executive power.
They might respectively hope that any future allocation of executive power would be more unequivocally in their favour, but they could not be certain about this. The only certainty would be that the future disposition of executive power would be uncertain. It might incline towards a single locus of executive responsibility, but the beneficiary would not be readily Neither side can therefore use the law to argue that it should have exclusive executive power, but both can resort to legal argumentation to delimit the sphere of executive power possessed by the other.
(b) Development of Policy Choices through the Council
The discussion thus far has focused on the way in which shared executive power might operate in relation to the setting of the EU's priorities and the planning of the annual and multi-annual agenda. It is equally important to consider how this shared power will play out in relation to the implementation of European Council initiatives.
The role of the President of the European Council within the Council is especially important in this respect. 75 We have already seen that the Giscardian plan, and the proposals from the UK in January 2003, accorded the President very considerable control over the Council and its formations. These proposals were not incorporated within Article I-23. The role of the President of the European Council within the Council nonetheless continued to be a cause of concern for the Commission, which feared that the President of the European
Council, who will normally be in office for five years, would exert greater influence in this respect than hitherto. This was apparent from its comments on the Draft Constitution, where it sought to confine the President's duties to chairing the European Council, and representing the Union in relation to the CFSP, 76 while excluding the President of the European Council from the task of organising the work of the Council. 77 The EP expressed similar concerns.
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While the more far-reaching Giscardian plan was not incorporated in the Draft Constitution, the President of the European Council may nonetheless be able to exert greater influence over the detailed implementation of European Council policy because of his role within the General Affairs Council (GAC). This Council formation is of central importance.
It is charged with ensuring consistency in the work of the other Council formations. It is charged also with preparing and ensuring the follow up to meetings of the European Council.
The centrality of the GAC explains much of the manoeuvring by key players. Some Member
States sought to have the President of the European Council be the President of the GAC. 79 The Commission for its part sought to modify the relevant provision so as to provide that the consistency task of the GAC should be performed in conjunction with the Commission. 80 Neither side won out. The Presidency of the GAC is, according to the revised IGC form of Article I-23, to be held for six months by each of the members of the team Presidency. The
Commission has not thus far managed to secure a formal role when the GAC performs its task of ensuring the consistency of the work of the different Council formations.
The President of the European Council has nonetheless a key role in the work of the GAC, which has been strengthened by the IGC revised version of Article I-23. Prior to the Draft Constitution the GAERC, when meeting in its GAC formation, had the obligation to prepare the European Council meetings and to ensure that they were followed-up. This obligation was embodied in the Council's Rules of Procedure. 81 The 
(c) Delegated Rule-making
The discussion until now has been concerned with the way in which shared executive power might operate in relation to the setting of the overall agenda, and follow-up to that agenda within the Council. It is also important to touch on the new regime for the making of delegated regulations.
The Draft Constitution provides for what are termed non-legislative acts. 83 A European regulation is a non-legislative act of general application for the implementation of legislative acts and certain specific provisions of the Constitution. It may either be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, or be binding as regards the result to be achieved, on all the Member States to which it is addressed, but leaving the national authorities entirely free to choose the form and means of achieving that result. The
Commission is empowered to enact delegated regulations to 'supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the European law or framework law'. 84 The objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation must be defined in the laws and framework laws, and the delegation may not cover the essential elements in the area, which shall be reserved for the law or framework law. The European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; or the delegated regulation may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the law or framework law.
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Space precludes a detailed analysis of these provisions, and their implications for the inter-institutional balance of power within the EU. This can be found elsewhere. 86 The relevance of this topic for the present analysis of executive power can nonetheless be highlighted as follows.
The constitutional strategy has been to regard delegated regulations as a species of executive power which should be exercised by the Commission, subject to the constraints identified above. This constitutional strategy, strongly supported by the Commission, was also been premised on the hope that the new category of delegated regulations will lead to the dismantling of Comitology, or at least the removal of the management and regulatory committees. The idea is therefore for the Commission in its executive capacity to be able to enact the relevant regulations, subject to the possibility of call back by the Council or EP.
It should however be noted that delegated regulations are only non-legislative in the formal sense that they are not primary laws. This does not mean that they are not legislative in nature. They clearly are, and this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that they are said to be of general application, that they can supplement or amend certain elements of primary law.
The reality is therefore that a European regulation will often be what would be regarded in In order to understand the disposition of executive power in this area it is important to view the creation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs within the more detailed framework of the CFSP. It is clear that executive authority within this area continues to reside with the European Council and the Council. It is the European Council that identifies the strategic interests and determines the objectives of the CFSP through strategic guidelines. 92 It is primarily the Council that adopts the decisions required to implement the strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council. 93 It is the Council once again that adopts decisions that define the EU's approach to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. 94 The primacy of place accorded to the European Council is even more marked in relation to defence. 95 It would seem therefore that executive authority within the EU in relation to CFSP matters continues to rest primarily with institutions of an intergovernmental nature, the European Council and the Council, and that this is so notwithstanding the creation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs who operates within the European Council, the Council and the Commission. There is undoubtedly force in this conclusion: CFSP matters do remain pretty firmly in the grip of the European Council and the Council, which make the operative decisions.
While this conclusion as to the disposition of executive power in relation to CFSP is correct in its essentials, it may however need to be qualified for the following legal and political reasons.
In legal terms, it should be noted that while the ECJ is, generally excluded from the CFSP, 96 it does have jurisdiction to adjudicate to ensure that the exercise of power pursuant to CFSP does not trespass on other heads of competence, and vice versa. To this extent, decisions made by the European Council and the Council will be subject to legal scrutiny.
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The ECJ also has jurisdiction in relation to review the legality of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Article III-224. Minister for Foreign Affairs will be responsible for these matters, 100 and that he will have a central place within the Council and the European Council is likely to increase and not decrease the Commission's overall influence in this area. This is so notwithstanding the fact that formal decision-making powers remain with the European Council and the Council.
(e) Financial Resources and the Budget
The direction of EU policy is by no means wholly dependent on money. The EU is rightly regarded as a regulatory state, such that many of its initiatives are not conditioned on expenditure from EU funds. This can be readily accepted, while at the same time acknowledging that control over the EU's resources and its budget are also matters of importance. The disposition of power in relation to these matters in the Draft Constitution is interesting.
In relation to resources, the Draft Constitution largely preserves the status quo ante. It 
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In relation to the budget, it is necessary to distinguish between the multi-annual financial framework and the annual budget. The multi-annual financial framework, which is to be established for a period of at least five years, is designed to ensure that EU expenditure develops in an orderly manner and within the limits of its resources. 103 It determines the amounts of the annual ceilings for commitment and payment appropriations. This framework is laid down in a European law made by the Council after obtaining the consent of the EP, and the first such framework made after the Constitution enters into force is to be made unanimously. 104 The annual budget must comply with the multi-annual financial framework. 105 Executive power in relation to setting of the financial framework is therefore shared principally between the Commission and the Council, since the European law made by the Council will be based on a proposal from the Commission. 106 The annual budget is, by way of contrast, made through a European law jointly by the EP and the Council on a proposal from the Commission. 107 Space precludes a detailed analysis of the provisions relating to the passage of the annual budget. 108 Suffice it to say for the present that the procedure is a modification of the ordinary legislative procedure, with special emphasis being given to the Conciliation Committee. The EP's powers have been increased because the distinction between 'compulsory' and 'non-compulsory' expenditure ahs been abolished, thereby making the EP a more equal branch of the budgetary procedure alongside the Council.
Part 4: Accountability in the Emerging EU Order
It is important to stand back from the detailed analysis of how shared executive power might operate and consider the emerging regime in terms of accountability. This inquiry could well occupy a paper or book 109 in itself. What follows does not therefore purport to be an exhaustive analysis. The object is rather to identify and distinguish some of the central issues that fall within the overall heading of accountability. There are three dimensions to this inquiry that should be distinguished.
Citizens' Understanding of the New Constitutional Order
The first line of inquiry concerns the extent to which the new regime will be understood by citizens of the EU. It is clear that one of the aims of the Laeken Declaration was to render the process of EU decision-making clearer and simpler for the EU citizenry. It is however doubtful whether this has been achieved in relation to the inter-institutional disposition of executive power. An informed citizen, reading the text of the Draft Constitution assiduously, would still find it difficult to understand the locus and distribution of executive power within the EU. It may well be that it was always going to be difficult to deliver on this aspiration from the Laeken Declaration in relation to the executive dimension of the EU. This was more especially so once it was decided within the Convention on the Future of Europe that there would be two Presidents for the EU, and that executive power would be divided between the European Council and the Commission.
Legal Accountability
A second dimension of accountability is legal in nature. The Draft Constitution left the general structure of the ECJ's jurisdiction unchanged. The European Council was not however subject to judicial review under what will now be Article III-270. This was anomalous given the nature of its powers under the Draft Constitution. This matter looks set to be addressed by the IGC. It has proposed a modification to Article III-270(1), so as to render the European Council subject to review in relation to acts that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 110 A similar amendment will bring the European Council within the ECJ's jurisdiction in relation to failure to act. These changes are to be welcomed.
It is clear as a matter of principle that binding acts of the European Council could also be challenged indirectly through national courts via the preliminary ruling procedure. The ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on, inter alia, the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Union, 111 and the European Council is clearly an institution of the Union. 
Political Accountability
It can be accepted at the outset that political accountability within a regime of shared executive power will be more complex than in those regimes where such power is concentrated more specifically within a particular part of the body politic called the executive. This is of course a trite proposition, but it is worth stating nonetheless, if only to clear the ground. Indeed it could be said to follow logically from a regime of shared executive power that there is not going to be a single line of executive accountability.
There is another proposition which is somewhat less obvious, but which should also be borne in mind at the outset. Parliamentary political systems in which executive power is located within a 'single' executive may well foster electoral accountability, in the important sense that the electorate can then throw out the party whose policies they dislike. It should however also be recognised that systems with a strong relatively unitary executive power can often generate serious problems of political accountability between elections. It is for this reason that some commentators in the UK have referred to the system as one of 'elective autocracy', to capture the idea that once a government is elected with a reasonable majority it has very considerable power and it becomes all the more difficult for the legislature to exert real control over agenda setting, policy choices and the like. Indeed, much of the discourse in the UK has been about the ways in which legislative control over the executive can be enhanced through the creation of legislative select committees, as well as other institutional reforms.
Bearing these points in mind we can now turn to political accountability within the emerging constitutional order. This is best examined by considering in turn accountability in relation to the setting of the overall political agenda, and in relation to the implementation of policy choices.
In relation to accountability for the overall political agenda, in the form of the multiannual programme, combined with the multi-annual financial framework, it will not be possible for the voters simply to express their dislike of the status quo and put another party into office with a different agenda. The very fact that executive power over agenda setting is shared between the Commission and the European Council prevents any such direct transmission of voter preferences. It would nonetheless be mistaken to believe that such preferences will have no effect under the disposition of power in the Draft Constitution. It should be remembered that the President of the Commission is elected by the EP and that the European Council must take account of the results of the European elections in deciding which person to put forward to the EP for election as Commission President. Thus, if the electorate dislike the direction of substantive European policy they can express this through a change in the composition of the EP, which will then have some force in the European Council's decision as to the candidate that should be put forward to the EP for election as Commission President.
It is moreover important to be realistic about the extent to which voter preferences Council completely. There is, however, no possibility that this will occur judged in terms of the reality of practical politics. Nor is it self-evidently desirable in normative terms:
legitimation within the EU has always been conceived in terms of representation of both state and voter interests, through the European Council/Council and EP respectively.
The reality under the Draft Constitution is that the multi-annual agenda will be the result of a discourse between the major institutional players. This discourse will incorporate voter preferences partly through the persona of the Commission President, and partly through consultation with the EP on the framework multi-annual agenda itself. The discourse will also clearly include state interests as mediated through the European Council and the Council.
This process may be 'messier' than that existing in nation states where there is a single unitary executive power. It does however avoid the kind of executive dominance over the political agenda adverted to above that can often attend executive-legislature relationships within such polities. The dialogue fostered by the system of shared executive power can be healthy in making actors re-think their own pre-conceived positions concerning the direction and pace of EU development. We have moreover already seen that the dangers of this leading to conflict between for example Commission and European Council over the direction of EU policy, leading to an incoherent agenda, are more likely to be outweighed by various factors that will engender co-operation between them.
Let us now turn to consider political accountability in relation to the implementation and execution of policy choices. There are of course different aspects of this process that must be disaggregated. The annual and multi-annual agenda will be developed in part through European laws and framework laws, which are legitimated through the ordinary legislative procedure initiated by the Commission. New-style delegated regulations will also be used.
There are, as we have seen, problems in this respect, which are reflective of the difficulty, more generally, of rendering the exercise of secondary rule-making power both workable and legitimate. We must also consider separately the issue of accountability as it relates to the implementation/execution of agreed policy choices, whether those choices are incorporated in European laws/framework laws or in delegated regulations. The Commission is clearly in the front line here, having the primary responsibility for policy implementation, as recognised in the Draft Constitution. 113 It is subject to a plethora of differing constraints, which relate in 
